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Abstract 
 
Mutual insurance companies and stock insurance companies are different forms of 
organized risk sharing: policyholders and owners are two distinct groups in a stock insurer, 
while they are one and the same in a mutual. This distinction is relevant to raising capital, 
selling policies, and sharing risk in the presence of financial distress. Up-front capital is 
necessary for a stock insurer to offer insurance at a fair premium, but not for a mutual. In 
the presence of an owner-manager conflict, holding capital is costly. Free-rider and 
commitment problems limit the degree of capitalization that a stock insurer can obtain. The 
mutual form, by tying sales of policies to the provision of capital, can overcome these 
problems at the potential cost of less diversified owners. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
An insurance corporation “organizes” risk sharing between individuals, and in principle, there are
two diﬀerent ways to do this. First, risks can be shared within the pool of policyholders. A
prominent example is a mutual insurer where policyholders are also the owners of the insurance
corporation. In this case, policyholders have participating contracts as all participate in the in-
surer’s surplus. Second, risks can be transferred from policyholders to another group of individuals
(investors). Stock insurers, for example, transfer risks from policyholders to shareholders, i.e. the
capital market. This transfer is achieved through the separation of rights to proﬁts and rights to
indemnity claims, thereby decoupling owners and customers (policyholders).
A large body of the insurance literature assumes that the level of aggregate future claims pay-
ment is certain. In this case, an actuarially fair premium equals the expected indemnity payment,
and no capital beyond premiums is needed. Moreover, there is no insolvency and, with full insur-
ance, the actuarially fair premium equals the expected loss. This implies that there is no diﬀerence
between a mutual insurer and a stock insurer with respect to the required capital, the fair premium,
and the distribution of risk. In this context, it is irrelevant whether rights to proﬁts and rights to
indemnity claims or, equivalently, owners and customers, are separated or not.
Ad i ﬀerent picture emerges if the level of total claims payment is uncertain. Then, the average
policyholder’s claim can be higher or lower than the insurer’s total capital, which includes risk
capital (equity) and premiums. If the policyholders’ claims are higher than the total capital, the
company is insolvent and total capital is distributed among policyholders. If claims are lower, the
excess funds accrue to the owners of the insurer. Risk capital is important to reallocate funds from
states where total claims are lower than total premiums to states where the reverse holds. The
way that risk capital is raised within these two organizational forms is markedly diﬀerent. A stock
insurer ﬁrst raises risk capital from investors (shareholders) and then sells insurance policies; while
a mutual insurer raises risk capital through premiums (raising risk capital is tied to selling insurance
2contracts).1 We show that these diﬀerent forms of raising capital have diﬀerent consequences in the
presence of ﬁnancial distress, in particular with respect to the actuarially fair premium, the degree
of capitalization, and managerial incentives to sell insurance policies.
An individual who buys an insurance policy from a mutual insurer also receives an ownership
right in the insurer. The premium net of the expected value of the ownership right equals the
expected claims payment. Hence, the insurance premium is always actuarially fair, independent
of the premium level paid by policyholders.2 However, a stock insurer needs risk capital provided
by shareholders in order to oﬀer insurance at an actuarially fair premium. To illustrate this point,
imagine that no risk capital is available and that policyholders pay some positive premium. If claims
are lower than premiums, the stock insurer is solvent and excess funds accrue to shareholders. If
claims are higher than premiums, the insurer is insolvent and the total payment to policyholders
equals the collected premiums. Hence, given the limited liability of shareholders and zero capital,
the expected payment to policyholders is lower than the premium, which is therefore not actuarially
fair.3
By providing risk capital, shareholders pay for the expected surplus they will make when claims
are lower than collected premiums. There is a unique actuarially fair premium for each level of
capital, which is below a policyholder’s expected loss and increases in the amount of capital that
shareholders provide. For a low (ﬁxed) level of capital, it can be optimal for risk-averse policyholders
if the policy exhibits loading for all policyholders. The reason is that by collectively providing
additional funds, additional risk sharing is created when the insurer is insolvent. This is costly to
policyholders as these funds accrue to shareholders when the insurer is solvent. Therefore, there is a
potential free-rider problem, as it is individually rational not to provide additional capital. Loading
1We do not consider subordinate debt. As there is a positive probability of default, subordinate debt cannot replace
equity and as both organizational forms can use subordinate debt at the same terms, this simplifying assumption
does not aﬀect our qualitative results.
2We deﬁne an actuarially fair premium to be the rate that is fair to policyholders, i.e. it is equal to the expected
claims payment. If there are no frictional costs of capital then this premium also provides a fair return to owners.
If there are frictional costs of capital, e.g. stemming from the owner-manager conﬂict considered in this paper, the
premium providing a fair return to owners might exceed the actuarially fair premium.
3In this case, shareholders earn a strictly positive expected return at the expense of policyholders.
3is a way to tie the raising of additional capital to selling insurance policies and thus overcome this
free-rider problem. A mutual can then be viewed as an organizational form that avoids the problem
of “additional funds” accruing to external investors.
This leads to our main contribution, which is to show how the mutual and the stock forms
diﬀer in their ability to raise capital. We assume that frictional costs of capital stem from a conﬂict
between the manager and owners, and this conﬂict exists for both stock and mutual insurers. The
manager is able to expropriate a fraction of the surplus, and the ﬁrm returns only the remaining
surplus to owners (shareholders or policyholders). Thus, it costs the same to provide a given amount
of capital either through issuing shares or through premiums. The main diﬀerence between the stock
and the mutual forms is that it is possible under the mutual form to restrict sales of policies to
those who also provide capital. Since competition in the insurance market restricts the return to
shareholders, it imposes an upper bound on the level of reimbursement for the (sunk) frictional cost
of capital. The higher the frictional cost of capital, the lower is the amount of capital that can be
raised and the degree of risk sharing provided by the insurer. For policyholders it would be optimal
to collectively provide additional capital, despite the frictional cost, to improve risk sharing. Thus,
the increase in utility from improved risk sharing compensates policyholders for a negative (unfair)
return on the invested capital. However, if buying insurance policies and providing capital are
separated, each policyholder has an incentive to free-ride on the capital provided by the others and
will not provide capital. For a mutual, the sales of policies and provision of capital are linked, and
the free-rider problem is overcome.
If the manager can expropriate a fraction of the insurer’s surplus, there is another interesting
diﬀerence between the two organizational forms with respect to the manager’s incentives to increase
the number of policyholders. We show that the incentives are generally higher for the mutual form
than for the stock form. The ex ante available capital in a stock insurer provides a cushion for the
manager, a fraction of which he is able to consume. The manager of a mutual has to “earn” this
cushion by selling insurance contracts.
Our paper contributes to an understanding of the diﬀerences between stock and mutual insurers.
4The existing literature discusses two main diﬀerences: diﬀerences in risk bearing (participating
versus non-participating contracts) and diﬀerences in governance (reducing the owner-customer
conﬂict versus reducing the owner-manager conﬂict). Smith and Stutzer (1990, 1995) focus on
the diﬀerent contractual structures of insurance contracts oﬀered by mutual insurers (participating
contract) and stock insurers (indemnity payment with a ﬂat fee). They argue that undiversiﬁable
risk drives participating contracts and that these contracts reduce problems of adverse selection
and moral hazard. Mayers and Smith (1981, 2005) focus on governance issues and argue that
diﬀerent organizational forms have diﬀerent advantages in dealing with diﬀerent types of agency
problems. The stock form is better suited to reducing the owner-manager conﬂict through the
market for corporate control, whereas the mutual form internalizes the owner-customer problem at
the expense of a higher owner-manager conﬂict. In our model, both organizational forms face an
identical owner-manager conﬂict: the manager can extract a fraction of the surplus. The distinction
that is central to our discussion is how the separation and non-separation of owners and customers
diﬀerentially impacts the raising of capital and selling of policies in the presence of this agency
problem. Thus, while the focus of Mayers and Smith is on how diﬀerent organizational forms can
inﬂuence (increase or decrease) diﬀerent types of agency problems, we take the agency problem as
given for both forms and analyze the eﬀects that it has on raising capital and providing insurance.
Assuming that the owner-manager problem is lower for a stock insurer than for a mutual insurer,
as suggested by Mayers and Smith, would not aﬀect our qualitative results.
Doherty and Dionne (1993) argue that when external capital is costly, consumers will substitute
by bearing risk themselves. Zanjani (2004) combines the arguments of Mayers and Smith (1981)
and Doherty and Dionne (1993): when external capital is costly, the level of external capital is
low so that the owner-manager conﬂict becomes less important and the mutual form is chosen
to reduce the owner-customer conﬂict. In our setting, the cost of capital includes agency costs
that apply equally to both capital provided by shareholders and premiums paid by policyholders.
Therefore, external capital is not more costly than internal capital. Nevertheless, it may be optimal
for policyholders to provide the capital and thus bear the risk themselves. The beneﬁto fc a p i t a l
5provided by policyholders is that the free-rider and commitment problems can be overcome when
raising capital is tied to selling policies. A direct consequence of tying ownership rights to policies
is that policyholders, instead of investors, have to bear the insurer’s surplus risk.
Smith and Stutzer (1995) and Zanjani (2004 and forthcoming) ﬁnd that mutual insurers are
u s e dm o r eo f t e ni nt i m e so fﬁnancial crises. Zanjani argues that one reason for this phenomenon is
that new stock insurers are more capital-intensive than mutual ﬁrms and that the use of mutuals
in times of capital market distress may represent a move away from external capital in production.
This ﬁnding is consistent with our model, as external (risk) capital is required to reallocate funds
between policyholders and owners. These funds are not required for mutual ﬁrms, as policyholders
are also owners. Moreover, Viswanathan and Cummins (2003) ﬁnd that recent demutualizations
were motivated by access to capital. Given a capital market where there are many investors, a
stock insurer can have a competitive advantage over a mutual through improved risk sharing.
We also contribute to the literature that analyzes the role of ﬁnancial distress in insurance
markets. Doherty and Schlesinger (1990) examine the demand for insurance under ﬁnancial distress,
and Mahul and Wright (2004a, 2004b) explore the optimal structure of insurance contracts for a
mutual insurer with limited capital. This literature does not analyze the relation among capital,
premiums, and ﬁnancial distress. Instead, the authors ﬁx the level of pre-paid premiums either
directly or indirectly by ﬁxing the probability of ﬁnancial distress. Cagle and Harrington (1995) and
Cummins and Danzon (1997) analyze insurance supply with capacity constraints and endogenous
insolvency risk. Their approach is quite diﬀerent from ours, as the authors focus on the eﬀect of
loss shocks on capitalization and premiums in insurance markets. Shareholders supply insurance
based on maximizing the expected value of net cash ﬂows under the assumption that capital is
costly. The demand side is given by some exogenously speciﬁed demand curve, which is assumed
to be negatively related to the price of insurance. In contrast to this literature, our paper focuses
on the trade-oﬀ between price and quality of insurance, which is crucial for the distinction between
a mutual and stock insurer in terms of the relation among capital, premiums, and risk sharing.
The pricing of insurance policies in the presence of insolvency risk is discussed by Doherty and
6Garven (1986) and Gründl and Schmeiser (2002). Doherty and Garven were the ﬁrst to propose
a contingent-claims approach to deal with insolvency risk in pricing insurance contracts. They
focus on price regulation in property-liability insurance. Gründl and Schmeiser compare diﬀerent
approaches for pricing double-trigger reinsurance contracts that are subject to default and also
discuss the relation between risk capital and ﬁnancial distress.
The paper is structured as follows. We present the model in Section 2 and examine the role of
capital and actuarially fair premiums under the two diﬀerent organizational forms in Section 3. In
Section 4, we discuss the role of the corporate form in the presence of governance problems and its
implication for managerial incentives to expand. We discuss the empirical predictions of our model
in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
2 The Model
There are n identical, risk-averse individuals each of which is endowed with initial wealth w0
and faces a loss of random size Xi, i =1 ,...,n. We assume that losses are independent and
identically distributed according to a continuous distribution function F1 with F1 (0) = 0 and
density function f1. The aggregate loss in the economy,
Pn
i=1 Xi, is then distributed according to
the n-fold convolution Fn =
¡
F1¢∗(n) with density function fn.
Risk sharing is organized through an insurance company, which can either be a stock insurer or
a mutual insurer. The insurer is run by a risk-neutral manager.
Stock insurer We consider the following three stages of setting up a stock insurance company.
At the ﬁrst stage, the company raises risk capital C from shareholders. At the second stage, the
manager sells insurance policies oﬀe r i n gf u l lc o v e r a g et ot h en individuals at a premium P per
policy. At the third stage, losses are realized, and the total capital, nP + C, is distributed to
policyholders and shareholders.
7Mutual insurer A mutual insurance company is owned by its policyholders, who own the right
to the insurer’s surplus. The company does not raise capital from shareholders, but through
selling policies at the second stage, i.e. the mutual has no capital other than the collected insurance
premiums. Suppose that each policyholder pays a premium Pm for full coverage. At the third stage,
losses are realized, and the company distributes the total capital, nPm, amongst policyholders.
The distinctions that are central to our discussion are the tying versus non-tying of ownership
rights to insurance policies as well as the sequential versus simultaneous way of raising capital and
selling policies.
Policyholders’ claims Let TCbe the insurer’s total capital, which is nP+C i nt h ec a s eo fas t oc k
insurer and nPm i nt h ec a s eo fam u t u a l .T h ei n s u r e ri ss o l v e n ti f
Pn
i=1 Xi ≤ TC, and insolvent
otherwise. If the insurer is solvent, then policyholders are fully indemniﬁed. If the insurer is
insolvent, then the company declares bankruptcy and the total capital is split amongst policyholders
a c c o r d i n gt os o m ep r e - s p e c i ﬁed bankruptcy rule, Ii (X1,...,X n),w i t h
Pn
i=1 Ii (X1,...,X n)=TC
and E [Ii (X1,...,X n)] = TC/nfor all i =1 ,...,n. A pro-rata rule would be deﬁned by4
Ii (X1,...,X n)=
Xi Pn
i=1 Xi
· TC.
Owners’ claims The owners have a claim to the excess funds, i.e. total capital net of total
claims payments, TC−
Pn
i=1 Xi, if the insurer is solvent. If the insurer is insolvent, the owners
are protected by limited liability. We refer to the excess funds as surplus and introduce an owner-
manager conﬂict by assuming that only the fraction (1 − α) of the surplus is returned to owners,
where α ∈ [0,1]. That is, owners receive (1 − α)(TC−
Pn
i=1 Xi).
α can be interpreted as a measure of the severeness of the owner-manager conﬂict. For example,
managers may be able to expropriate a fraction of the ﬁrm’s surplus in the form of consumption
4Such a sharing rule, where policyholders receive a share of the insurer’s assets that is proportional to their claim,
is assumed in much of the literature (see, e.g., Cummins and Danzon, 1997, who conﬁrm that “this liquidation rule
is consistent with the way insurance bankruptcies are handled in practice,” footnote 22).
8of perks, investment of funds in projects with a negative net present value, or outright fraud.
This frictional cost of capital does not represent an exogenous bias for or against providing capital
through either corporate form. While diﬀerences in the governance mechanisms certainly can result
in shifts of the relative importance of diﬀerent types of agency conﬂicts, the purpose of our paper
is to highlight diﬀerences in organizational forms that are above and beyond direct diﬀerences in
the relative importance of agency problems.
Preferences A common assumption in the insurance literature is that shareholders in a stock
insurer are well diversiﬁed and that the surplus risk is unsystematic. Shareholders are therefore
risk-neutral with respect to the surplus risk. We follow this assumption throughout our analysis.
Of course, a shareholder may also be a policyholder of an insurer that he holds in his portfolio. In
this case the implicit assumption is that the individual is risk neutral with respect to the payoﬀ
from the share of stock in the insurer, but risk averse in his personal loss. The assumption serves as
a good approximation as the surplus risk stems from a diversiﬁed portfolio of many policyholders
while the risk of a personal loss of size Xi is solely borne by individual i (if uninsured).
For the same reason, we assume that the owners of a mutual are also risk-neutral with respect
to the insurer’s surplus risk. Policyholders’ utility is additively separable in ﬁnal wealth stemming
from surplus risk and from personal losses. Moreover, we assume constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA). The utility of a policyholder in a mutual can therefore be written as
u(W)=u
¡
WI
1
¢
+
1
n
(1 − α)
³
TC−
Xn
i=1 Xi
´+
where
WI
1 =
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
w0 − Pm
w0 − Pm − X1 +
X1 Pn
i=1 Xi
nPm
if
ΣiXi ≤ nPm
ΣiXi >n Pm
93 Actuarially Fair Premium and Financial Distress
In this section, we examine the role of capital provided by owners under the two organizational
forms focusing on the companies’ ability to oﬀer an actuarially fair premium. We show that it can
be optimal for policyholders in a stock insurer to raise additional funds through a loading in order
to improve risk sharing. To highlight this eﬀect, in this section we assume that there is no frictional
cost of capital under either corporate form, i.e. α =0 , and that the amount of capital provided
by shareholders is exogenously ﬁxed. We thus concentrate on the functions of selling policies and
distributing total capital to claimants and owners.
The actuarially fair premium, Pfair, equals the expected indemnity payment to the policyholder
and is therefore lower than the policyholder’s expected loss if there is a positive probability that the
company can become insolvent. The actuarially fair premium therefore depends on the company’s
insolvency probability, which, in turn, depends on the level of the premium, as collected premiums
are available for claim payments. Another important determinant of the insolvency risk and level
of the actuarially fair premium is the amount of shareholders’ capital in the company, C.
To clarify the interconnection between the actuarially fair premium and insolvency risk of a stock
corporation, we examine the two extreme scenarios: zero capital and unlimited ﬁnancial capital
held by the company. With unlimited capital the company never goes bankrupt and policyholders
are always fully indemniﬁed. This implies that the actuarially fair premium equals the expected
loss to the insured. If the stock corporation has no capital, i.e. C =0 , there is still a strictly positive
probability that the company remains solvent and that the collected premiums exceed the aggregate
claims by policyholders. In this case, the remaining funds are paid out to shareholders, and the
expected payout to policyholders is lower than the premium, which contradicts the deﬁnition of an
actuarially fair premium. Without capital the only actuarially fair premium is therefore zero.
Under a mutual organization, policyholders are also the owners of the ﬁrm and all premiums
collected are redistributed. Each policyholder receives Xi + Pm − 1
n
Pn
i=1 Xi in case of solvency
and Ii (X1,...,X n) in case of insolvency. The premium therefore comprises the expected indemnity
10payment and the value of the ownership right. This implies that any premium Pm provided by the
policyholder of a mutual insurer is actuarially fair.
In the following proposition, we formalize these arguments and show that for stock insurers the
actuarially fair premium is increasing in the amount of capital provided by shareholders.
Proposition 1 For a stock insurer, there exists a unique actuarially fair premium for each ﬁxed
level of capital provided by shareholders. Furthermore, the actuarially fair premium is increasing
in the amount of capital, from zero without capital to the level of the expected loss with unlimited
capital. For a mutual insurer, any premium provided by policyholders is actuarially fair.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Proposition 1 highlights an important distinction between stock and mutual insurers. A suﬃ-
ciently high level of capital C is required to oﬀer a substantial amount of insurance at an actuarially
fair premium in the case of a stock insurer. This capital has to be provided by shareholders who
beneﬁt from states in which total premiums exceed total claims. The role of capital is thus to
reallocate funds from states where shareholders make a proﬁt to states where total premiums are
lower than the policyholder’s losses.
Optimal Loading We now investigate the optimality of the actuarially fair premium based on
policyholders’ preferences. For a stock insurer, the actuarially fair premium, and thereby the
likelihood that the company stays solvent, is increasing in the amount of capital C provided by
shareholders. Policyholders’ level of expected utility is therefore also increasing in C. If providing
risk capital is costless, i.e. if capital markets are perfect, then it would be optimal to have unlimited
risk capital available. In this case, the insurer is always solvent, and full insurance is achieved at
af a i rp r e m i u m ,Pfair(∞)=E[X1], as shown in Proposition 1. Policyholders are fully indemniﬁed
and thus not willing to pay a loading in excess of the fair premium.
Suppose now that a stock insurer’s risk capital is limited by some level ˆ C<+∞, e.g., raising
capital might be costless up to ˆ C but inﬁnitely costly beyond ˆ C. If the company is insolvent,
11then policyholders will not be fully indemniﬁed. Their marginal utility is therefore higher in states
in which the company is insolvent compared to states in which funds are suﬃcient to receive full
coverage. As policyholders are risk-averse, they wish to transfer money from solvency-states to
insolvency-states and in particular to those insolvency-states with relatively high claims. In the
following proposition, we show that it is optimal for policyholders to pay a loading on top of the
fair premium if capital provided by shareholders is limited.
Proposition 2 For a stock insurer, if capital provided by shareholders is small (great), then it is
optimal (not optimal) for policyholders to pay a loading in excess of the actuarially fair premium.
Furthermore, if policyholders’ preferences exhibit constant absolute risk aversion, then the optimal
loading is decreasing in the level of capital provided by shareholders.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
This proposition implies that under constant absolute risk aversion there exists a critical thresh-
old of capital such that it is optimal for policyholders to collectively pay a loading for all levels of
capital below that threshold and not to pay a loading for all levels above that threshold.
By collectively paying a loading in excess of the actuarially fair premium, policyholders reduce
their wealth in solvency-states to the beneﬁt of shareholders. At the same time, more funds are
available to be distributed to policyholders in insolvency-states. Reasonable bankruptcy rules may
therefore create a form of coinsurance amongst policyholders if these additional funds accrue to
those policyholders with relatively high claims.5 Policyholders thus trade oﬀ higher premiums for
additional insurance against the possibility that these funds are not used to pay claims and instead
accrue to shareholders. In addition to this trade-oﬀ, the loading also reduces the probability of
insolvency. On the one hand, this is beneﬁcial to policyholders, as they are more likely to be fully
indemniﬁed. On the other hand, a reduction of the insolvency probability has a negative eﬀect on
the trade-oﬀ described above. It is now more likely that the additional funds accrue to shareholders.
5Mahul and Wright (2004b) show that the Pareto-optimal mutual risk sharing contract with limited capital includes
a deductible which is adjusted ex-post depending on realized losses to meet the capital constraint.
12The proposition shows that creating this form of coinsurance in insolvency-states is particularly
beneﬁcial if little capital is provided by shareholders.
If increasing shareholders’ capital is not an option, paying a loading is akin to “back door”
capital. In the extreme scenario, where ˆ C =0 , we have shown in Proposition 1 that no insurance
can be oﬀered at an actuarially fair premium. By paying a loading, policyholders would in fact
initiate risk sharing. Providing these additional funds, however, is costly for policyholders and
generates strictly positive rents for existing shareholders. Alternatively, policyholders could form a
mutual in which they have a claim on the excess funds.
4 Governance Problems and the Role of the Corporate Form for
Raising Capital, Selling Insurance, and Sharing Risk
4.1 Raising Capital
In this section, we endogenize the capital that can be raised from shareholders in the ﬁrst stage
of insurance company launch. As mentioned before, if capital markets are perfect, it is optimal
for policyholders if the insurer raises inﬁnite capital from shareholders and sells policies at the
actuarially fair rate, that equals the expected value of the loss. If raising capital is costly, then the
optimal capital is ﬁnite and the premium has to compensate shareholders for the frictional cost of
capital.
We ﬁrst examine a benchmark case: the optimal solution for a stock insurer if premium and
capital are chosen simultaneously. In practice, a stock insurer will have to raise capital before
selling insurance policies. Thus, the benchmark case corresponds to a situation where policyholders
commit to a premium P when capital is raised from shareholders.
Stock insurer with commitment The optimal combination of premium P and capital C for
policyholders has to satisfy the shareholder’s participation constraint. A general assumption in the
insurance literature is that policyholders pay an actuarially fair premium that equals the expected
13indemnity payment. Underlying this assumption are (i) competition in the insurance market where
shareholders make zero proﬁt and (ii) a frictionless capital market where shareholders can recall
their capital at zero cost so that they would not sell insurance if premiums fall below the actuarially
fair premium. Following (i), we also assume that the shareholders’ participation constraint is
binding (zero proﬁt condition). Thus, the amount of capital that shareholders provide equals the
expected repayment to shareholders:
C =( 1− α)E
∙³
C + nP −
Xn
i=1 Xi
´+¸
.( 1 )
The premium has to exceed the actuarially fair premium to cover the frictional cost of capital. With
commitment, the optimal capital C∗ and premium P∗ are determined by the following optimization
problem
(C∗,P∗) = arg max
(C,P)
E [u(W1)]
subject to (1) where each policyholder’s ﬁnal wealth is given by
W1 =
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
w0 − P
w0 − P − X1 +
X1 Pn
i=1 Xi
(C + nP)
if
ΣiXi ≤ C + nP
ΣiXi >C+ nP
.
Lemma 1 The zero expected proﬁt condition for shareholders (1) provides a one-to-one, increasing
mapping between capital and premium. Furthermore, the optimal premium P∗ paid by policyholders
includes a loading that compensates shareholders for the frictional cost of capital.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
In the proof to Lemma 1, we show that the optimal premium P∗ exhibits a loading that exactly
covers the frictional cost of capital stemming from the governance problem. Speciﬁcally,
n
¡
P∗ − P∗
fair
¢
= αE
∙³
C∗ + nP∗ −
Xn
i=1 Xi
´+¸
,
14with P∗
fair = E
£
Xi · 1{ΣiXi≤C∗+nP∗} + Ii (X1,...,X n) · 1{ΣiXi>C∗+nP∗}
¤
. P∗
fair is deﬁned as a pol-
icyholder’s expected indemnity payment given the insurer’s total capital TC = C∗ + nP∗.W e
refer to P∗
fair as the actuarially fair premium. Thus, nP∗ equals the total expected payment to
policyholders plus the expected frictional cost of capital. P∗ can be interpreted as the fair premium
that assures that shareholders earn a fair return on their invested capital, where P∗ − P∗
fair is the
required loading that policyholders have to pay. Therefore, shareholders earn a (quasi) rent that
compensates them for the frictional cost of capital. Without a frictional cost of capital (α =0 )t h e
two levels of premium coincide, P∗ = P∗
fair (see footnote 2).
Stock insurer without commitment We now assume that commitment is not possible and that
instead the premium P is determined after capital has been raised.6 An important characteristic
of the frictional cost of capital is that the cost is sunk once the capital has been raised. As an
extreme example, consider the case where the insurer does not sell any policies. Shareholders are
then only repaid (1 − α)C. Thus, after providing the insurer with capital C, shareholders would
make a loss of αC if they do not sell insurance policies, but recall their funds. This provides
policyholders with hold-up power after capital has been raised. Indeed, shareholders would at this
point in time be willing to sell insurance at a premium even below the fair premium. Shareholders’
interim participation constraint is
(1 − α)E
∙³
C + nP −
Xn
i=1 Xi
´+¸
≥ (1 − α)C (2)
and diﬀers from their ex-ante participation constraint (1).
We assume that the premium P is determined through a negotiation game after capital has been
raised. The level of P depends on the bargaining power of policyholders relative to shareholders.
Suppose that all bargaining power rests with policyholders. In this case, for a given level of capital
6A commitment problem is also the reason why policies cannot be sold before raising capital. In this case, initial
owners have an incentive to not raise additional capital. This problem is directly related to the debt-overhang problem
discussed by Myers and Majluf (1984).
15C, the premium P (C) will be determined by the following optimization problem
P (C) = argmax
P
E [u(W1)]
with
W1 =
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
w0 − P
w0 − P − X1 +
X1 Pn
i=1 Xi
(C + nP)
if
ΣiXi ≤ C + nP
ΣiXi >C+ nP
,
subject to shareholders’ interim participation constraint (2).
Ex-ante, the level of capital provided by shareholders, C, and the level of premium, P (C),
implied by the interim optimization problem must jointly satisfy the zero expected proﬁt condition
for shareholders (1), C =( 1− α)E
h
(C + nP (C) −
Pn
i=1 Xi)
+
i
. A necessary condition for such a
capital level to be strictly positive is that the shareholders’ interim participation constraint is not
binding. This implies that the level of capital C is so low that it is optimal for policyholders to pay
a loading (see Proposition 2), which compensates shareholders for the frictional cost of capital.
Proposition 3 Suppose that all bargaining power rests with policyholders in the interim negotiation
game.
1. There exists a unique, strictly positive level of capital, C > 0,s u c ht h a tC and the premium
P (C) implied by the negotiation game satisfy the zero expected proﬁt condition for sharehold-
ers (1).
2. If α>0, then without commitment, the stock insurer is undercapitalized compared to the
situation with commitment; that is, C <C ∗ and P (C) <P∗.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
This proposition implies that shareholders will only provide a higher level of capital if they
have some bargaining power at the negotiation stage, i.e., if competition after capital investment
is imperfect. Let’s consider the extreme scenario in which all bargaining power in the negotiation
16game rests with shareholders. For a given level of capital C shareholders will extract a premium
P = P (C) at which the participation constraint of policyholders is binding. This implies that if
shareholders provide the level of capital C∗, then they will extract a premium P = P (C∗) >P ∗.
Ex-ante, this yields strictly positive proﬁts for shareholders. Shareholders must therefore provide a
level of capital C>C ∗ at which the capital C and the implied premium P
¡
C
¢
y i e l dt h a tb o t ht h e
ex-ante zero expected proﬁt condition for shareholders (1) and the interim participation constraint
for policyholders are binding. In this situation, the company is overcapitalized compared to the
situation with commitment; that is, C>C ∗ and P
¡
C
¢
>P∗.
Interpolating from the discussion above, there exists a speciﬁc level of relative bargaining power
between shareholders and policyholders at the interim negotiation game that results in the eﬃcient
l e v e lo fc a p i t a lC∗ and premium P∗. In all other cases, capital provision is ineﬃcient.
As in the case with commitment, a necessary condition for a positive level of capital is that the
premium P exceeds the actuarially fair premium by a loading P −Pfair to compensate shareholders
for the frictional cost of capital. The main diﬀerence is that with commitment it is possible
to commit to the level of premium loading before capital is raised by the insurer while without
commitment no such ex ante speciﬁcation of premium loading is possible. In this case, it may be
optimal for policyholders to collectively provide additional capital to improve risk sharing. The
increase in utility from improved risk sharing compensates policyholders for a negative (unfair)
return of their stock. However, as buying insurance policies and buying stock are separated, each
policyholder has an incentive to free-ride on the capital provided by the others and will not buy
stock.
Mutual insurer For a mutual insurer capital is raised through the premium when selling insur-
ance policies. This is an important diﬀerence between a stock insurer and a mutual, which results
from the policyholders also being the owners.
In the case of a mutual, the optimal premium Pm for policyholders is determined by the
17optimization problem
max
Pm E
∙
u
¡
WI
1
¢
+
1
n
(1 − α)
³
nPm −
Xn
i=1 Xi
´+¸
where WI
1 is given by
WI
1 =
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
w0 − Pm
w0 − Pm − X1 +
X1 Pn
i=1 Xi
nPm
if
ΣiXi ≤ nPm
ΣiXi >n Pm
.
A mutual overcomes the commitment and free-rider problem by tying selling insurance policies
and raising capital. The premium Pm is a joint payment for insurance policy and ownership rights.
Of course, any decomposition of the premium into a payment for the insurance contracts and a
payment for the ownership rights is arbitrary. What matters for our comparison of the mutual and
stock form is the amount of total capital, i.e., it suﬃces to compare nPm and nP + C.
The mutual ﬁrm’s optimization problem that yields the optimal Pm, which maximizes policy-
holders’ expected wealth, is equivalent to the optimization problem of the stock corporation with
commitment. Bundling insurance and capital, the mutual can raise the optimal amount of overall
capital, nPm∗ = C∗+nP∗, which — if policyholders’ bargaining power is suﬃciently large in a com-
petitive market — exceeds the overall capital that can be raised by a stock insurer in the presence
of commitment problems (see Proposition 3). Better risk sharing is therefore achieved in the states
where the stock insurer would be insolvent: the mutual has a lower probability of insolvency and
more funds to reallocate in the case of ﬁnancial distress.
Comparative statics of governance problems Improved mechanisms of corporate governance
might reduce the owner-manager conﬂict α and aﬀect the relative advantage of a mutual over a
stock insurer. In the extreme scenario without an owner-manager conﬂict, α =0 , the capitalization
of a mutual and a stock insurer is identical. Since the frictional cost of capital is zero, policyholders
are not able to hold-up shareholders after capital has been raised and the ex-ante and the interim
18participation constraints (1) and (2), are identical. This implies that the stock insurer can raise
the eﬃcient level of capital. In the other extreme scenario in which the manager expropriates all
the surplus, α =1 , ownership rights are worthless and the capitalization of both organizational
forms is again identical. The only funds available are provided by policyholders as strictly positive
loading is optimal for zero capital (see Proposition 2).
Suppose that policyholders’ bargaining power in the interim negotiation game is so high that
the stock insurer (without commitment) is undercapitalized compared to the mutual insurer (see
Proposition 3). Since both mutual and stock insurer are equally capitalized for α =0 ,t h er e l a t i v e
advantage of a mutual over a stock insurer decreases if α is reduced for small levels of α. A reduction
in α raises the levels of capitalization under both corporate forms but the commitment problem
becomes less severe and thereby reduces the relative advantage of the mutual form. In contrast,
the relative advantage of a mutual over a stock insurer increases if α is reduced for high levels of
α.F o rα =1 , the levels of capitalization under both corporate forms are equally low. Overcoming
the commitment problem through the mutual form and thereby raising more capital is therefore
particularly valuable.
4.2 Managerial Incentives to Expand
The two diﬀerent organizational forms also provide contrasting managerial incentives to expand
the number of customers. To gain intuition for this diﬀerence, we ﬁrst ﬁxt h el e v e lo fc a p i t a lC and
focus on the eﬀect of increasing the customer base on the probability of ﬁnancial distress.
The number of policies underwritten is important for risk sharing as it aﬀects the probability
of ﬁnancial distress and the number of policyholders who have to bear the risk in case of ﬁnancial
distress. This is true for both organizational form s ,am u t u a la n das t o c ki n s u r e rw i t hl i m i t e dc a p i -
tal. However, the eﬀect of increasing the number of policyholders on risk sharing crucially depends
on whether owners and customers are separated or whether they coincide. In fact, increasing the
number of policyholders has opposite eﬀects for a mutual and a stock insurer with ﬁxed capital C
oﬀering insurance at an actuarially fair rate.
19Proposition 4 Suppose that the number of policyholders is large such that the Central Limit The-
orem can be applied. For a stock insurer with a given level of capital C and an implied actuarially
fair premium Pfair(n,C), the probability of ﬁnancial distress is increasing in the number of poli-
cyholders. For a mutual insurer with premium Pm >E [X1], the probability of ﬁnancial distress is
decreasing in the number of policyholders.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
The diﬀerence between a stock insurer and a mutual insurer is again that the level of capital
provided by shareholders is ﬁxed in the case of a stock corporation. Increasing the customer
base thus has a negative eﬀect on shareholders’ capital per policy, which outweighs the positive
“diversiﬁcation” eﬀect and the eﬀect on the fair premium. In contrast, since policyholders are also
owners in the case of a mutual, selling actuarially fair insurance to policyholders is tied to ownership
rights. Policyholders in a mutual provide capital and pay for the indemnity payment at the same
time. Selling insurance policies at a ﬁxed premium thus also raises capital, and the average total
funds per policy remains constant.
The same intuition applies to diﬀerences in managerial incentives to expand the company.
Suppose that a manager has to exert privately costly eﬀort, c(q),t os e l lq policies, which is increasing
in q. Furthermore, the manager derives a private beneﬁto fδ that is increasing in the surplus.7 If
q policies are sold, the manager’s utility under the two organizational forms are
Us (q)=δE
∙³
C + qP −
Xq
i=1 Xi
´+¸
− c(q)
in case of a stock insurer and
Um (q)=δE
∙³
qPm −
Xq
i=1 Xi
´+¸
− c(q)
in case of a mutual insurer. We assume that the objective is to sell n insurance contracts and
7Note that we allow the beneﬁtt ot h em a n a g e rt od i ﬀer from the cost to owners. Moreover, similar results obtain
if the manager incurs a disutility from the company’s insolvency.
20analyze how the manager’s utility changes when the number of policies increases from q to n under
the two organizational forms.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the number of policyholders is large such that the Central Limit Theo-
rem can be applied. The managerial incentives to expand the number of customers are higher under
the mutual form than under the stock form if Pm >E[X1] and nPm >C+ nP.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
The diﬀerence in incentives stems from the diﬀerences in how capital is raised and mirrors the
intuition for Proposition 4. Stock insurers raise a ﬁxed amount of capital ﬁrst, then sell policies.
Increasing the number of policies then reduces the average capital available for each policy. This
eﬀect dominates the diversiﬁcation beneﬁt. Mutual insurers raise capital while selling insurance
policies. Since the total premium and capital for ownership rights are constant, the beneﬁto f
reducing the variance of the average claim dominates. This implies that if the mutual and the
stock insurer are equally capitalized, i.e. nPm = C + nP, the managerial incentives to expand are
higher under the mutual form. If the mutual company is better capitalized, i.e. nPm >C+nP,w e
show in the proof of Proposition 5 that the managerial incentives to expand under a mutual form
are increasing in the amount of capital, as long as Pm >E[X1], and thereby are also higher than
under the stock form.
The ex ante available capital in a stock insurer provides a cushion for the manager–the fraction
δ o fw h i c hh ei se v e na b l et oc o n s u m ei ft h eﬁrm is solvent–while the manager of a mutual has to
“earn” this cushion by selling insurance contracts.
5 Discussion and empirical predictions
The mutual form dominates the stock form in our model because of a commitment problem involved
in raising capital and setting premiums. A central assumption for the dominance of a mutual is
that governance problems are identical for the mutual form and the stock form. We make this
21assumption to carve out the commitment problem. Reducing the governance problem for both
organizational forms increases the beneﬁt of a mutual if governance problems are very high and
decreases the beneﬁt of a mutual if governance problems are very low.
Of course, in practice, the governance problems may not be identical for both organizational
forms. For example, Mayers and Smith (1981, 2005) argue that the owner-manager conﬂict is
lower for a stock insurer than for a mutual insurer. Moreover, capital market regulation aimed at
increasing shareholder rights may reduce governance problems for a stock insurer, but not for a
mutual insurer. Another potential beneﬁt of the stock form may be that shareholders are better
diversiﬁed than policyholders. If we relax the assumption that policyholders are perfectly diver-
siﬁed in the surplus risk, policyholders demand a risk premium for bearing surplus risk. In this
case, ownership rights in the mutual are worth less to policyholders than ownership rights are to
shareholders in a stock insurer. The eﬀect is qualitatively equivalent to a higher α for a mutual,
which also decreases the value of ownership rights for a mutual relative to the stock form. In well
developed capital markets where governance problems of a stock insurer are low and shareholders
are better diversiﬁed than the owners of a mutual, the disadvantage of the commitment problem
may be overcome.
Our model therefore predicts that:
1. The advantage of a mutual insurer comes to force when insurers have to recapitalize, e.g.
after large shock to capital due to a catastrophic event, in times where stock markets are
underdeveloped (high governance problems and low shareholder diversiﬁcation). In this case,
the mutual form has a comparative advantage in recapitalizing through selling new policies.
2. The beneﬁt of a stock insurer arises in its ability to better spread risk when stock markets
allow a high level of diversiﬁcation through a large and dispersed group of investors. Thus, if
governance problems are small, then the stock form has a comparative advantage in spreading
risk. Alternatively, mutuals are forced to change their corporate form when the diversiﬁcation
advantage increases.
22The ﬁrst prediction is consistent with empirical evidence that the mutual form dominated after
large shocks.8 For example, the New York Fire of 1835 wiped out most stock insurers and stimulated
the formation of mutual insurers (Smith and Stutzer, 1995). Zanjani (2004 and forthcoming) ﬁnds
that mutual insurers are used more often in times of ﬁnancial crises. He argues that the reason is
that new stock insurers are more capital-intensive than mutual ﬁrms and that the use of mutuals
in times of distressed capital markets may substitute for (external) capital in production.
Prediction 2 is consistent with observed demutualization in countries with highly developed
stock markets that are motivated by access to capital (Viswanathan and Cummins, 2003).
A second set of predictions relates to the implications of how regulation aﬀects the beneﬁto f
one organizational form over the other.
3. Regulation that aims at increasing policyholders’ rights may harm stock insurers more than
mutual insurers.
4. Initial minimum capital requirements imply that capital has to be raised before policies are
sold. If the required capital is very high for a stock insurer, the commitment problem combined
with the frictional cost of capital may be prohibitive.
5. A regulatory requirement of maintaining a minimum level of capital to support insurance
operations might reduce the relative disadvantage of stock insurers.
The rationale underlying prediction 3 is that stock insurers rely on quasi rents to compensate
shareholders for the frictional cost of capital. Increasing policyholders’ rights reduces the insurers
rent, which makes it more diﬃcult for a stock insurer to raise capital. This is consistent with
ﬁndings by Fletcher (1966) who argues that the 1905 Armstrong Investigation’s negative impact on
8Even though insurance market crisis are also associated with high premiums, stock insurers cannot just raise
capital. Due to the commitment problem, shareholders of a stock insurer must fear that, after a large increase in
capacity if several insurers raise capital after a shock, insurance premiums will fall quickly, leaving them uncompen-
sated for the frictional cost of capital. This is in line with Winter (1994) and Gron (1994) who argue that after a
sudden loss, insurers respond by increasing premiums rather than raising external capital.
23the proﬁt making opportunities of insurers played an important role in motivating mutualizations
of three major stock life insurance companies in New York.
High initial capital requirements may pose a problem for a stock insurer due to the commitment
problem of raising funds through policies to reimburse shareholders for high frictional cost of capital.
Zanjani (forthcoming) ﬁnds that initial capital requirements were a major determinant of the
choice of mutuals between 1900 and 1949. Mutuals were formed in states with low initial capital
requirements for mutuals and diﬀerentially high initial capital requirements for stock corporations.
The economic rationale for this ﬁnding is not immediately clear. High capital improves risk sharing
and may therefore be even beneﬁcial. However, as we argue, it can be diﬃcult to raise capital ex
ante in the presence of frictional cost of capital.
In contrast, selling policies ﬁrst and then being forced to raise some capital can reduce the
problem that premiums may not cover the (sunk) frictional cost of capital if capital is raised ﬁrst.
Regulatory capital requirements can thus serve as a commitment device to the extent that the
insurer can raise the required capital after policies have been sold.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we emphasize the distinction between mutual and stock insurers in organizing risk
sharing in the presence of governance problems that may exist under both corporate forms. In a
stock corporation, the eﬃciency of risk sharing is inherently linked to the level of capital provided
by shareholders and the degree to which shareholders are diversiﬁed. In a mutual corporation,
risks are shared among policyholders only, and the eﬃciency of risk sharing therefore depends
on the size of the pool of policyholders. In an eﬃcient capital market without frictions and where
shareholding is dispersed, risk sharing can optimal l yb eo r g a n i z e dt h r o u g has t o c ki n s u r e r .H o w e v e r ,
in the presence of an owner-manager conﬂict where the manager can expropriate a fraction of the
insurer’s surplus, the insurance premium has to compensate shareholders for this expropriation
of funds. When insurance policies are sold, shareholders already have exposed their capital, and
24competition in the insurance market may result in a premium that does not provide a suﬃciently
high (quasi) rent to cover the loss from expropriation. When governance problems are large, the
level of capital and risk sharing in a stock insurer may be low. A mutual links the provision of
capital and premium. Thus, policyholders directly bear the cost of providing capital. Moreover,
policyholders cannot free-ride on others to provide capital at unfair terms.
25AA p p e n d i x : P r o o f s
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
For a stock insurer, the actuarially fair premium Pfair(C) for a policyholder as a function of capital provided
by shareholders is implicitly deﬁned by
Pfair(C)=E
£
Xi · 1{ΣiXi≤nPfair(C)+C} + Ii (X1,...,Xn) · 1{ΣiXi>nPfair(C)+C}
¤
.
Summing over all policies yields
nPfair(C)=E
hXn
i=1 Xi · 1{ΣiXi≤nPfair(C)+C} +( nPfair(C)+C) · 1{ΣiXi>nPfair(C)+C}
i
=
Z nPfair(C)+C
0
xdF n (x)+( nPfair(C)+C)(1− Fn (nPfair(C)+C)),( 3 )
where Fn is the n-fold convolution of F1 and thus the distribution function of the aggregate loss
Pn
i=1 Xi.
For C =0we have
nPfair(0) =
Z nPfair(0)
0
xdF n (x)+nPfair(0)(1 − Fn (nPfair(0)))
which is satisﬁed for Pfair(0) = 0. For any Pfair(0) > 0 we deduce
Z nPfair(0)
0
xdF n (x)+nPfair(0)(1 − Fn (nPfair(0))) <n P fair(0).
Pfair(0) = 0 is therefore the unique solution to (3).
For C =+ ∞, the company is never insolvent and the actuarially fair premium is given by Pfair(∞)=E [X1].
For any 0 <C<∞,d e ﬁne the expected loss for all policyholders from each paying a premium P as
f (P)=nP −
Z nP+C
0
xdFn (x) − (nP + C)(1− Fn (nP + C)).
The actuarially fair premium Pfair(C) is thus characterized by
f (Pfair(C)) = 0.
We have
f (0) = −
Z C
0
xdF n (x) − C (1 − Fn (C)) < 0
and
f (∞)=∞
for all 0 <C<∞. Furthermore
f0 (P)=n − n(1 − Fn (nP + C)) = nFn (nP + C) > 0.
As f (·) is a continuous function in P the intermediate value theorem implies that there exists a unique
solution Pfair(C) > 0 for f (Pfair(C)) = 0.
26Implicitly diﬀerentiating (3) with respect to C yields
nP 0
fair(C)=
¡
nP0
fair(C)+1
¢
(1 − Fn (nPfair(C)+C))
which implies
P0
fair(C)=
1
n
1 − Fn (nPfair(C)+C)
Fn (nPfair(C)+C)
> 0
for all C>0. The actuarially fair premium is thus strictly increasing in the amount of risk capital.
For a mutual insurer, suppose policyholders provide a premium Pm. This premium is actuarially fair if
and only if
Pm = E
∙µ
Xi + Pm −
1
n
Xn
i=1 Xi
¶
· 1{ΣiXi≤nP m} + Ii (X1,...,Xn) · 1{ΣiXi>nP m}
¸
with
Pn
i=1 Ii (X1,...,Xn)=nPm and E [Ii (X1,...,Xn)] = Pm for all i =1 ,...,n. Summing over all policies
yields that total premiums provided, nPm, are actuarially fair. Since all policies have the same expected
value of payout, each single premium provided is actuarially fair.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose that the insolvency rule speciﬁe sap r o - r a t ar u l e ,i . e .
Ii (X1,...,X n)=
Xi Pn
i=1 Xi
³
nP + ˆ C
´
,
and let ∆ denote the loading in excess of the actuarially fair premium.9 The ﬁnal level of wealth of a
policyholder, e.g. policyholder 1,i st h e ng i v e nb y
W1 (∆)=
⎧
⎨
⎩
wS (∆)=w0 − P − ∆
wIS(∆)=w0 − P − ∆ − X1 +
X1 Pn
i=1 Xi
³
n(P + ∆)+ ˆ C
´ if
Pn
i=1 Xi ≤ n(P + ∆)+ ˆ C Pn
i=1 Xi >n(P + ∆)+ ˆ C
.
where wS (∆) and wIS (∆) are the levels of ﬁnal wealth in solvency- and insolvency-states respectively. The
actuarially fair premium P = Pfair
³
ˆ C
´
is implicitly deﬁned by (3). The policyholder’s expected utility of
ﬁnal wealth is given by
E [u(W1 (∆))]
= u(wS (∆))Fn
³
n(P + ∆)+ ˆ C
´
+
Z ∞
n(P+∆)+ ˆ C
u(wIS(∆))dFn (
Pn
i=1 xi)
= u(wS (∆))Fn
³
n(P + ∆)+ ˆ C
´
+
Z ∞
0
Z ∞
n(P+∆)+ ˆ C−x1
u(wIS(∆))dFn−1 (x−1)dF 1 (x1),
9For expositional purposes, we focus on the pro-rata rule as bankruptcy rule. The results, however, are robust
to any “reasonable” bankruptcy rule that allow to create the form of coinsurance decsribed above. More precisely,
the bankruptcy rule must be such that the marginal beneﬁt of an extra dollar under bankruptcy is increasing in the
realized size of the loss.
27where x−1 =
Pn
i=2 xi.D i ﬀerentiating expected utility with respect to ∆ yields
∂E[u(W1 (∆))]
∂∆
= −u0 (wS (∆))Fn
³
n(P + ∆)+ ˆ C
´
+
Z ∞
0
Z ∞
n(P+∆)+ ˆ C−x1
µ
−1+
nx1
x1 + x−1
¶
u0 (wIS(∆))dFn−1 (x−1)dF 1 (x1).
The second derivative is given by
∂2E [u(W1 (∆))]
∂∆2 = u00 (wS (∆))Fn
³
n(P + ∆)+ ˆ C
´
− nu0 (wS (∆))fn
³
n(P + ∆)+ ˆ C
´
+
Z ∞
0
Z ∞
n(P+∆)+ ˆ C−x1
µ
−1+
nx1
x1 + x−1
¶2
u00 (wIS(∆))dF n−1 (x−1)dF 1 (x1)
−nu0 (wS (∆))
Z ∞
0
Ã
−1+
nx1
n(P + ∆)+ ˆ C
!
fn−1
³
n(P + ∆)+ ˆ C − x1
´
dF 1 (x1)
= u00 (wS (∆))Fn
³
n(P + ∆)+ ˆ C
´
−
n2
n(P + ∆)+ ˆ C
u0 (wS (∆))
Z ∞
0
x1fn−1
³
n(P + ∆)+ ˆ C − x1
´
dF 1 (x1)
+
Z ∞
0
Z ∞
n(P+∆)+ ˆ C−x1
µ
−1+
nx1
x1 + x−1
¶2
u00 (wIS(∆))dF n−1 (x−1)dF 1 (x1)
< 0.
Expected utility is thus globally concave in ∆ and any inner solution ∆∗
³
ˆ C
´
to the FOC
∂E[u(W1 (∆))]
∂∆
|∆=∆∗( ˆ C) =0 (4)
is therefore the unique global maximum. For ˆ C = ∞,w eh a v ePfair(∞)=E [X1] and the ﬁrst derivative is
given by
∂E[u(W1 (∆))]
∂∆
| ˆ C=∞ = −u0 (w0 − E [X1] − ∆) < 0.
As expected utility is decreasing in ∆,w eg e tt h ec o r n e rs o l u t i o n∆∗ (∞)=0 .10 As ∆∗
³
ˆ C
´
is continuous
in ˆ C, ∆∗
³
ˆ C
´
=0for large values of ˆ C.F o rˆ C =0 ,w eh a v ePfair(0) = 0 (Proposition A.1) and the ﬁrst
derivative is given by
∂E[u(W1 (∆))]
∂∆
| ˆ C=0
= −u0 (w0 − ∆)Fn (n∆)
+
Z ∞
0
Z ∞
n∆−x1
µ
−1+
nx1
x1 + x−1
¶
u0
µ
w0 − ∆ − x1
µ
1 −
1
x1 + x−1
(n∆)
¶¶
dF n−1 (x−1)dF1 (x1).
10The participation constraint for risk-neutral shareholders providing capital imposes ∆ ≥ 0.
28Evaluating this derivative at ∆ =0yields
∂E[u(W1 (∆))]
∂∆
| ˆ C=0,∆=0 =
Z ∞
0
Z ∞
0
µ
−1+
nx1
x1 + x−1
¶
u0 (w0 − x1)dF n−1 (x−1)dF 1 (x1)
= E
∙
u0 (w0 − X1)
µ
−1+
nX1
X1 + X−1
¶¸
= Cov
µ
u0 (w0 − X1),
nX1
X1 + X−1
¶
+ E [u0 (w0 − X1)]E
∙
−1+
nX1
X1 + X−1
¸
.
We have
E
∙
−1+
nX1
X1 + X−1
¸
= −1+nE
∙
X1
Σn
i=1Xi
¸
= −1+
Pn
i=1 E
∙
Xi
Σn
i=1Xi
¸
=0
and therefore
∂E[u(W1 (∆))]
∂∆
| ˆ C=0,∆=0 = Cov
µ
u0 (w0 − X1),
nX1
X1 + X−1
¶
> 0.
This implies ∆∗ (0) > 0. Again, as ∆∗
³
ˆ C
´
is continuous in ˆ C, ∆∗
³
ˆ C
´
> 0 for small values of ˆ C.
Total diﬀerentiation of the FOC (3) with respect to ˆ C and ∆ implies
d∆∗
³
ˆ C
´
d ˆ C
= −
∂2E[u(W1(∆))]
∂∆∂ ˆ C |∆=∆∗( ˆ C)
∂2E[u(W1(∆))]
∂2∆ |∆=∆∗( ˆ C)
.
As expected utility is globally concave in ∆ we derive
sign
⎛
⎝
d∆∗
³
ˆ C
´
d ˆ C
⎞
⎠ = sign
µ
∂2E [u(W1 (∆))]
∂∆∂ ˆ C
|∆=∆∗( ˆ C)
¶
.( 5 )
Recall that P = Pfair
³
ˆ C
´
, i.e.
∂E[u(W1 (∆))]
∂∆
= −u0
³
w0 − Pfair
³
ˆ C
´
− ∆
´
Fn
³
n
³
Pfair
³
ˆ C
´
+ ∆
´
+ ˆ C
´
+
Z ∞
0
Z ∞
n(Pfair( ˆ C)+∆)+ ˆ C−x1
µ
−1+
nx1
x1 + x−1
¶
·u0
µ
w0 − Pfair
³
ˆ C
´
− ∆ − x1
µ
1 −
1
x1 + x−1
³
n
³
Pfair
³
ˆ C
´
+ ∆
´
+ ˆ C
´¶¶
dF n−1 (x−1)dF 1 (x1).
29T h ec r o s s - d e r i v a t i v ei st h e ng i v e nb y
∂2E [u(W1 (∆))]
∂∆∂ ˆ C
= P0
fair
³
ˆ C
´
u00 (wS (∆))Fn
³
n
³
Pfair
³
ˆ C
´
+ ∆
´
+ ˆ C
´
−
³
nP0
fair
³
ˆ C
´
+1
´
u0 (wS (∆))fn
³
n
³
Pfair
³
ˆ C
´
+ ∆
´
+ ˆ C
´
+
Z ∞
0
Z ∞
n(Pfair( ˆ C)+∆) + ˆ C−x1
µ
−1+
nx1
x1 + x−1
¶
·
µ
−P0
fair
³
ˆ C
´
+
x1
x1 + x−1
³
nP 0
fair
³
ˆ C
´
+1
´¶
u00 (wIS(∆))dFn−1 (x−1)dF 1 (x1)
−
³
nP0
fair
³
ˆ C
´
+1
´
u0 (wS (∆))
·
Z ∞
0
⎛
⎝−1+
nx1
n
³
Pfair
³
ˆ C
´
+ ∆
´
+ ˆ C
⎞
⎠fn−1
³
n
³
Pfair
³
ˆ C
´
+ ∆
´
+ ˆ C − x1
´
dF 1 (x1)
= P0
fair
³
ˆ C
´
u00 (wS (∆))Fn
³
n
³
Pfair
³
ˆ C
´
+ ∆
´
+ ˆ C
´
+
Z ∞
0
Z ∞
n(Pfair( ˆ C)+∆) + ˆ C−x1
µ
−1+
nx1
x1 + x−1
¶
·
µ
−P0
fair
³
ˆ C
´
+
x1
x1 + x−1
³
nP 0
fair
³
ˆ C
´
+1
´¶
u00 (wIS(∆))dFn−1 (x−1)dF 1 (x1)
−
n
³
nP0
fair
³
ˆ C
´
+1
´
n
³
Pfair
³
ˆ C
´
+ ∆
´
+ ˆ C
u0 (wS (∆))
Z ∞
0
x1fn−1
³
n
³
Pfair
³
ˆ C
´
+ ∆
´
+ ˆ C − x1
´
dF 1 (x1).
In Proposition A.1, we have shown that P0
fair
³
ˆ C
´
> 0 which implies
∂2E [u(W1 (∆))]
∂∆∂ ˆ C
<
Z ∞
0
Z ∞
n(Pfair( ˆ C)+∆) + ˆ C−x1
µ
−1+
nx1
x1 + x−1
¶
·
µ
−P0
fair
³
ˆ C
´
+
x1
x1 + x−1
³
nP0
fair
³
ˆ C
´
+1
´¶
u00 (wIS(∆))dF n−1 (x−1)dF1 (x1).
Introducing the constant coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion Ra = −
u00(w)
u0(w) yields
∂2E [u(W1 (∆))]
∂∆∂ ˆ C
< −Ra
Z ∞
0
Z ∞
n(Pfair( ˆ C)+∆)+ ˆ C−x1
µ
−1+
nx1
x1 + x−1
¶
·
µ
−P0
fair
³
ˆ C
´
+
x1
x1 + x−1
³
nP0
fair
³
ˆ C
´
+1
´¶
u0 (wIS(∆))dF n−1 (x−1)dF 1 (x1).
For −1+ nx1
x1+x−1 > 0 we have
−P0
fair
³
ˆ C
´
+
x1
x1 + x−1
³
nP0
fair
³
ˆ C
´
+1
´
>
1
n
30and thus
−
µ
−1+
nx1
x1 + x−1
¶µ
−P0
fair
³
ˆ C
´
+
x1
x1 + x−1
³
nP0
fair
³
ˆ C
´
+1
´¶
< −
1
n
µ
−1+
nx1
x1 + x−1
¶
For −1+ nx1
x1+x−1 < 0 we have
−P0
fair
³
ˆ C
´
+
x1
x1 + x−1
³
nP0
fair
³
ˆ C
´
+1
´
<
1
n
and thus
−
µ
−1+
nx1
x1 + x−1
¶µ
−P0
fair
³
ˆ C
´
+
x1
x1 + x−1
³
nP0
fair
³
ˆ C
´
+1
´¶
< −
1
n
µ
−1+
nx1
x1 + x−1
¶
.
This implies
∂2E [u(W1 (∆))]
∂∆∂ ˆ C
< −Ra
1
n
Z ∞
0
Z ∞
n(Pfair( ˆ C)+∆)+ ˆ C−x1
µ
−1+
nx1
x1 + x−1
¶
u0 (wIS(∆))dF n−1 (x−1)dF 1 (x1).
The FOC (4) for ∆∗
³
ˆ C
´
implies
Z ∞
0
Z ∞
n(P+∆∗( ˆ C))+ ˆ C−x1
µ
−1+
nx1
x1 + x−1
¶
u0
³
wIS
³
∆∗
³
ˆ C
´´´
dFn−1 (x−1)dF 1 (x1)
= u0
³
wS
³
∆∗
³
ˆ C
´´´
Fn
³
n
³
P + ∆∗
³
ˆ C
´´
+ ˆ C
´
and therefore
∂2E [u(W1 (∆))]
∂∆∂ ˆ C
|∆=∆∗( ˆ C) < −Ra
1
n
u0
³
wS
³
∆∗
³
ˆ C
´´´
Fn
³
n
³
Pfair
³
ˆ C
´
+ ∆∗
³
ˆ C
´´
+ ˆ C
´
< 0.
Finally, (5) implies
d∆∗
³
ˆ C
´
d ˆ C
< 0.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
We prove that the condition
C =( 1− α)E
∙³
C + nP −
Xn
i=1 Xi
´+¸
(6)
is a one-to-one, increasing mapping between C and P.L e tP be given and deﬁne the function f by
f (C)=C − (1 − α)E
∙³
C + nP −
Xn
i=1 Xi
´+¸
= C − (1 − α)
Ã
(C + nP)Fn (C + nP) −
Z C+nP
0
xdF n (x)
!
.
31We have
f (0) = −(1 − α)
Ã
nPFn (nP) −
Z nP
0
xdF n (x)
!
< 0
f (∞)=∞
and
f0 (C)=1− (1 − α)Fn (C + nP) > 0.
This shows that for all P there exists a unique C = C (P) such that (6) is satisﬁed.
Implicitly diﬀerentiating (6) with respect to P yields
C0 (P)=
(1 − α)nFn (C (P)+nP)
1 − (1 − α)Fn (C (P)+nP)
.
Thus C0 (P) > 0 for 0 ≤ α<1 and C0 (P)=0for α =1 .
The solution P∗ can be decomposed in the actuarially fair premium
P∗
fair = E
∙
Xi · 1{ΣiXi≤C∗+nP ∗} +
Xi Pn
i=1 Xi
(C∗ + nP∗) · 1{ΣiXi>C∗+nP ∗}
¸
and a premium loading P∗
load = P∗ − P∗
fair. Summing over all policies yields
nP∗
fair = E
h
min
³Xn
i=1 Xi,C∗ + nP∗
´i
.
Combining this equation with (1) implies
nP ∗
load =
α
1 − α
C∗ = αE
∙³
C∗ + nP∗ −
Xn
i=1 Xi
´+¸
.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
1. From Lemma 1 we know that for each level of capital C there exists a unique P = P (C) such that
the ex-ante zero expected proﬁt condition
C =( 1− α)E
∙³
C + nP (C) −
Xn
i=1 Xi
´+¸
is satisﬁed. The premium P (C) that results from the maximization of policyholders’ expected utility
subject to the interim shareholders’ participation constraint must include a strictly positive, optimal
loading, ∆∗ (C), that compensates shareholders for the frictional cost of capital, i.e.
n∆∗ (C)=αE
∙³
C + n(Pfair(C)+∆∗ (C)) −
Xn
i=1 Xi
´+¸
.
Deﬁne the function f by
f (C)=n∆∗ (C) − αE
∙³
C + n(Pfair(C)+∆∗ (C)) −
Xn
i=1 Xi
´+¸
.
32We note that
f (0) = n∆∗ (0) − αE
∙³
n∆∗ (0) −
Xn
i=1 Xi
´+¸
> 0
as ∆∗ (0) > 0 (see Proposition 2). We have also shown in Proposition 2 that there exists a level of
capital ˜ C>0 below (above) which the optimal loading is strictly positive (zero), i.e. ∆∗ (C) > 0 for
all C<˜ C and ∆∗ (C)=0for all C ≥ ˜ C. Evaluating the function f at C = ˜ C yields
f
³
˜ C
´
= −αE
∙³
˜ C + nPfair
³
˜ C
´
−
Xn
i=1 Xi
´+¸
< 0.
Last, we show that f is strictly decreasing in C
f0 (C)=n∆∗0 (C) − α
¡
1+n
¡
P0
fair(C)+∆∗0 (C)
¢¢
Fn (C + n(Pfair(C)+∆∗ (C)))
= n(1 − αFn (C + n(Pfair(C)+∆∗ (C))))∆∗0 (C)
−α
¡
1+nP0
fair(C)
¢
Fn (C + n(Pfair(C)+∆∗ (C))).
We have shown in Proposition 2 that ∆∗0 (C) < 0 a n di nP r o p o s i t i o n1t h a tP0
fair(C) > 0. Therefore
f0 (C) < 0. This implies that there exists a unique C with 0 <C< ˜ C such that f (C)=0 .
2. For a stock insurer facing the commitment problem, the optimal loading ∆∗ (C) provided by policy-
holders at the interim stage satisﬁes the following FOC (see Proof A.2 of Proposition 2)
∂E[u(W1 (∆∗ (C)))]
∂∆
= −u0 (wS (∆∗ (C)))Fn (n(Pfair(C)+∆∗ (C)) + C)
+
Z ∞
0
Z ∞
n(Pfair(C)+∆∗(C))+C−x1
µ
−1+
nx1
x1 + x−1
¶
u0 (wIS(∆∗ (C)))dF n−1 (x−1)dF 1 (x1)
=0 .
For a stock insurer not facing the commitment problem, policyholders’ expected utility of ﬁnal wealth
is given by
E [u(W1 (P))]
= u(wS (P))Fn (nP + C (P)) +
Z ∞
nP+C(P)
u(wIS(P))dF n (
Pn
i=1 xi)
= u(wS (P))Fn (nP + C (P)) +
Z ∞
0
Z ∞
nP+C(P)−x1
u(wIS (P))dFn−1 (x−1)dF 1 (x1),
where
W1 (P)=
⎧
⎨
⎩
wS (P)=w0 − P
wIS(P)=w0 − P − X1 +
X1 Pn
i=1 Xi
(nP + C (P)) if
Pn
i=1 Xi ≤ nP + C (P) Pn
i=1 Xi >n P+ C (P) .
and C (P) is the unique level of capital that satisﬁes the zero expected proﬁt condition (see Lemma
331). Diﬀerentiating expected utility with respect to P yields
∂E[u(W1 (P))]
∂P
= −u0 (wS (P))Fn (nP + C (P))
+
Z ∞
0
Z ∞
nP+C(P)−x1
µ
−1+( n + C0 (P))
x1
x1 + x−1
¶
u0 (wIS(P))dF n−1 (x−1)dF 1 (x1)
Evaluating this derivative at the premium level of the stock insurer facing the commitment problem,
i.e. at P = P (C)=Pfair(C)+∆∗ (C), yields
∂E[u(W1 (P))]
∂P
|P=P(C) = C0 (P (C))
Z ∞
0
Z ∞
nP(C)+C−x1
x1
x1 + x−1
u0 (wIS(P (C)))dF n−1 (x−1)dF 1 (x1).
In Lemma 1 we have shown C0 (P) > 0 and thus
∂E[u(W1(P))]
∂P |P=P(C) > 0. This implies P∗ >P(C).
As the ex-ante zero expected proﬁt condition provides an increasing mapping between capital and
premium (see Lemma 1) we conclude C∗ >C.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
For a stock insurer with limited capital C a n di m p l i e df a i rp r e m i u mPfair(n,C), the probability of ﬁnancial
distress is given by
prob(
Pn
i=1 Xi >n P fair(n,C)+C).
Applying the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) yields
prob(
Pn
i=1 Xi >n P fair(n,C)+C)=prob(Z>z(n))
where Z is standard normally distributed and
z (n)=
√
n
σ(X1)
(Pfair(n,C) − E [X1]) +
1
√
nσ (X1)
C.
This implies that
sign
µ
∂
∂n
prob(
Pn
i=1 Xi >n P fair(n,C)+C)
¶
= −sign(z0 (n)).( 7 )
Recall equation (3) which deﬁnes Pfair(n,C) through
nPfair(n,C)=E
hXn
i=1 Xi · 1{ΣiXi≤nPfair(n,C)+C} +( nPfair(n,C)+C) · 1{ΣiXi>nPfair(n,C)+C}
i
.
Applying the CLT to this equation yields
z (n) −
1
√
nσ (X1)
C =
Z z(n)
−∞
zdN (z)+z (n)(1− N (z (n))),
34where N (·) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. By implicitly
diﬀerentiating with respect to n we deduce
z0 (n)+
1
2n
√
nσ(X1)
C = z0 (n)(1− F (z (n)))
which implies
z0 (n)=−
1
2n
√
nσ (X1)F (z (n))
C<0.
Equation (7) then proves
∂
∂n
prob(
Pn
i=1 Xi >n P fair(n,C)+C) > 0.
F o ram u t u a li n s u r e rw i t hﬁxed premium Pm >E[X1], the probability of ﬁnancial distress is given by
prob(
Pn
i=1 Xi >n Pm).
Applying the CLT yields
prob(
Pn
i=1 Xi >n Pm)=prob
µ
Z>
√
n
σ (X1)
(Pm − E [X1])
¶
,
which implies
∂
∂n
prob(
Pn
i=1 Xi >n Pm) < 0.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 5
Incentives stemming from the eﬀect on the utility are higher under the mutual form if
Um (n) − Um (q) >U s (n) − Us (q).( 8 )
If the mutual and stock company are equally capitalized, nP m = C + nP implies Us(n)=Um(n).
Furthermore, for Pm = C/n+ P we obtain
Us (q)=δE
∙³
C + qP −
Xq
i=1 Xi
´+¸
>δ E
∙³q
n
C + qP −
Xq
i=1 Xi
´+¸
= Um (q)
and condition (8) holds.
If the mutual company is better capitalized, i.e. nPm >C+ nP,w ep r o v e(8) by showing that the
managerial incentives to expand a mutual insurer are increasing in the capital of the company. We thus have
to show that
Um (n|Pm) − Um (q|Pm) >U m (n|γPm) − Um (q|γPm)
for 0 ≤ γ<1 and
Um (q|Pm)=δE
∙³
qPm −
Xq
i=1 Xi
´+¸
− c(q).
35This inequality is equivalent to
E
∙³
nPm −
Xn
i=1 Xi
´+¸
− E
∙³
nγPm −
Xn
i=1 Xi
´+¸
>E
∙³
qPm −
Xq
i=1 Xi
´+¸
− E
∙³
qγPm −
Xq
i=1 Xi
´+¸
.
We will prove the inequality by using the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) to show that E
h
(nPm −
Pn
i=1 Xi)
+i
−
E
h
(nγPm −
Pn
i=1 Xi)
+i
is increasing in n. The CLT implies
E
∙³
nPm −
Xn
i=1 Xi
´+¸
− E
∙³
nγPm −
Xn
i=1 Xi
´+¸
(9)
=
1
√
2π
n
√
n
σ(X1)
ÃZ z2(n)
0
(z2 (n) − z)e− 1
2z2
dz −
Z z1(n)
0
(z1 (n) − z)e− 1
2z2
dz
!
where z1 (n)=
γPm−E[X1]
σ(X1)/
√
n and z2 (n)=
P m−E[X1]
σ(X1)/
√
n .T h eﬁrst term of the product is increasing in n.D i ﬀer-
entiating the second term with respect to n yields
∂
∂n
ÃZ z2(n)
0
(z2 (n) − z)e− 1
2z2
dz −
Z z1(n)
0
(z1 (n) − z)e− 1
2z2
dz
!
= z0
2 (n)
Z z2(n)
0
e− 1
2z2
dz − z0
1 (n)
Z z1(n)
0
e− 1
2z2
dz
=
1
2σ(X1)
√
n
Ã
(Pm − E [X1])
Z z2(n)
0
e− 1
2z2
dz − (γPm − E [X1])
Z z1(n)
0
e− 1
2z2
dz
!
Deﬁne the function f by
f (γ)=( Pm − E [X1])
Z z2(n)
0
e− 1
2z2
dz − (γPm − E [X1])
Z z1(n)
0
e− 1
2z2
dz.
If γPm − E [X1] ≤ 0 then f (γ) > 0 (as Pm >E[X1])a n d(9) is increasing in n.I fγPm − E [X1] > 0,t h e n
f (1) = 0 and
f0 (γ)=−Pm
Z z1(n)
0
e− 1
2z2
dz − (γPm − E [X1])
Pm
σ(X1)/
√
n
e− 1
2z1(n)2
< 0.
Since f is strictly decreasing and f (1) = 0,w ed e r i v et h a tf (γ) > 0 for all 0 ≤ γ<1. (9) is therefore
increasing in n.
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